Shareholders interests play a relevant role in corporate governance. Notwithstanding the different legal regimes across the globe, there is a trend towards converging mechanisms protect shareholders through disclosure and other instruments. Simplification of voting process and procedures to ease the taking into account of shareholder preferences are matters still to be resolved.
Introduction
Corporate governance deals with different conflicts of interests which appear and are related to the way companies are managed. From a comparative perspective, laws vary considerably in their attitude to resolving these Corporate Governance challenges 1 . Answers can be found in internal governance mechanisms (By-Laws and self regulation), and external governance instruments (regulation, supervision, etc.) 2 . The ways how those conflicts are debated and resolved have a great impact over countries business, over how investors are attracted to companies and over capital markets structures.
Traditionally, European countries (with the exception of UK) are said to have less attractive capital markets than Anglo-American countries; this has been explained frequently by cultural and regulatory elements including corporate governance structures and different points of view in relation with Companies aims and shareholders' interest. The relatively rapid convergence of some aspects of Corporate governance standards around the world which has occurred during the last 30 years is limiting the impact of pre-existing country-specific cultural values that impact upon the way how companies protect their shareholders. 1 Mäntysaari, P , Comparative Corporate Governance (Shareholders as a Rule -maker), Heidelberg, 2005. 2 Kordel, G. "Behavioural Corporate Governance from a Regulatory Perspective: Potential and limits of Regulatory Intervention to Impact the Conduct of Corporate Actors", European Business Organisation Law Review, 9, 2008) Among the consequences brought in by the turning of the Century, we find that Companies, Investors, Regulators and society in general claim for more transparency, and are prone to promote more accountability of business. This transparency is claimed particularly on behalf of investors and shareholders.
Generally speaking and in particular within the field of Big Corporations, Shareholders are owners of such Companies. However, they do not possess much direct decision-making authority 3 . In order to determine the relevance of shareholders within the Company, it is necessary to differentiate among types of share ownership and its political significance -Majority control holders. They hold more that a 50% of shares in the Company (what is extremely unlikely in listed companies) they control the decision making process and appointments to the Board. -Shareholders with a minority control. They are able to exercise power over company decisions above their percentage holding, -given the lack of internal opposition able to balance their influence. Some of these minorities commit themselves to the long-term development of the company, and are known as "inner circle" shareholders. They are particularly active in continental European countries, with a tradition for block controlling shareholders (families, banks, etc.). -Other long term minority shareholders. They do not belong to the inner circle but remain in shareholding to obtain a return to their investment. They help in granting stability to the company. -Other minorities -long term private investors or sort term private investors-have extremely reduced power to intervene or influence management. -Institutional Investors. Institutional investors hold substantial financial resources obtained from their own private investors, and they trade in different corporations. They are not a homogeneous category on their own 4 . Significant changes in the structure and composition of shareholdings in big corporations have taken place over the last years. In particular, private shareholding is in decline, whilst control of equity by institutional funds has increased -particularly after 1970 5 . One relevant reason behind this trend is that small equity investors face many risks which have been made evident during the XXth Century. They may be taken advantage of in a number of ways by those in control of the Company (Boards or largest shareholders). They are likely to be subject to waste of corporate resources without either benefiting themselves, nor having a real possibility of influencing decision making processes.
In parallel with a lesser purely private investment, institutional investment has growing influence in Corporations. After the 2ndWorld War they have progressively acquired bigger proportions of capital and the potential for a leading role in management control. This has been facilitated by low transactions costs and by the increased level of direct contact with companies. During the latter years of the XXth Century there has been another trend: more concentration of investment as more liquid Institutional Investors and Funds that focus their portfolios in a fewer number of corporations. Concentration leads to closer contact with companies and their boards, and this, in turn allow Institutional Investors some of the mechanisms needed to optimise their investments, without a need for disinvesting or voting with their feet. Being better informed and having greater shareholders influence, investment risk is effectively reduced. Fund managers may concentrate their investments in companies they favour, in order to benefit from the resources that they are able to apply and they gain power in the field of corporate oversight. Largest fund managers have acquired the power to influence management, although their interest in doing so remains limited: Only when the size of their investment forces direct involvement; large Institutional shareholders are likely 4 8 . Furthermore, the need for diversification among single investors contributed to the modern separation of ownership and control. Reasons for this are embedded in the particular corporate culture, agency problems and free raider problems. If shares are widely dispersed among numerous owners, agency problems are increased by collective action problems. Fearing that all other stakeholders will free-ride other's efforts to exercise their collective right, each shareholder will avoid investing in actions. As a result, they rather disinvest or stay inactive than actively participate in Corporate decisions or try to influence board appointments. Shareholder's ability to affect the election of directors is perceived as the factor that determines their degree of influence over the Corporation. But in America, dispersion of investments together with the complexity of the proxy regime under Securities Exchange Act section 14(a) discourage large shareholders from seeking to 6 The size of a holding is a key influence on a fund manager's approach to its role in a company. The smaller a stake of a company's issued capital, the less likely it is that a fund manager will commit internal resources to the making o a strategic or management changes, and the bigger stake in a company, the more likely it is that the fund manager will commit resources to making changes. 7 9 . Throughout Europe (particularly in the Continent and especially in countries like Germany and Sweden), shareholdings are more concentrated and there is a stronger presence and influence of banks than in North America. Shareholders role in the decision making is mostly related to monitoring, and not so much to decision making, although certain questions such as changes in company incorporation usually require their support and they are to agree on certain takeover defences 10 . There are some national "specialities". In countries with a more concentrated shareholding such as Germany or Spain, shareholders can have the power to control management, particularly due to the existence of a supervisory board (Germany) where the interests of shareholders are represented 11 . On the other hand, in the UK, 9 Andenas 20 . This difference reflects more protective environment to minority shareholders in the EU. But even taking into account market control measures, shareholders powers remain limited.
Insterests and obstacles to decision making by shareholders
The general landscape that we have just described shows that shareholders exercise only minor powers over decision making. This is particularly so in Anglo American legal Systems, but even in Europe -unless the said shareholders have are block holders.
Public Companies can be seen as means by which capital is raised from a large number of public savers. Under that focus, corporate governance may focus on the suppliers of capital (creditors and shareholders), leaving directors and managers to control the business. While other interests have also been recognized, still to date they are generally considered as external to the core of Corporate Governance.
In the last ten to fifteen years, concerns about shareholder protection and involvement has increased across the globe 21 . There is a growing debate, particularly in USA and Europe, on whether Corporate Governance systems are advancing in a way towards convergence, or whether in the future we shall see greater divergence in the ways how shareholders' rights are dealt with. The answer to this question is not easy. Path dependency will possibly always remain, however legal systems can learn from each other, particularly in a globalised world. Each legal system will need to evolve and to adapt their Corporations' decision making processes to achieve a better balancing of evolving interests; and they need to do so in a way that allows for sustainable growth. Notwithstanding path dependency, the need to grant shareholders, including minor investors a stronger position within Corporations seems to be up in all legal Agendas across the globe. The mayor challenges of balancing interests to improve shareholders role on Corporate decisions comprise at least the following issues:
Lack and misuse of information
Asymmetry in information impedes the development of organisations to their optimal point 22 . For Corporate systems to function correctly it is necessary to prevent asymmetries and also to offer incentives for gathering information. Many aspects of modern regulation over the globe are oriented precisely to limiting or reducing asymmetries of information.
The primary legal doctrine for avoiding conflict issues is that of fiduciary duties of Officers and Directors to the Company and its shareholders. Within those, the duty of loyalty, requires the directors not pursue their own interests over those of the company and its shareholders. It covers a very wide range of issues.
Central concerns of shareholders that suffer lack of information is self-enrichment by those in control. This type of behaviour is possible due to the position that some (managers, Directors, inner circle shareholders, related parties, etc.) hold in relation with the Corporation: its business opportunities, information, etc.
Although information has generally a positive effect it can be used as an instrument to unduly benefit certain market agents by opposition to others. As we have seen, there are various types of shareholders. There are relevant asymmetries between big/block investors, and small investors in relation with their access to information. The possibility also exists for board members to abuse their positions.
Information and insiders
Top management, Board members, large block holders, or inner circle shareholders frequently have greater access to non-public information than others. When large shareholders have board representation, this becomes unavoidable. Even where the large holder lacks formal board representation, it may often benefit from selective disclosures by management. In either case, disclosure of information to large block shareholders raises serious insider trading concerns.
Insiders' access to information puts them in a position to extract (for themselves or for others') undue benefits through conducts such as insider trading, whistle blowing, taking advantage of corporate opportunities, etc. A deeper analysis of these conducts leads to their definition as an offense against the corporation or/and to the market. Also this gives way to rules such as the "disclose or abstain" to create a levelled playing field in a way that outsiders and insiders can access the same information.
International diversity in insider's regimes is often attributed to cultural traditions. In USA, insider practices were usually legal in history at common law. Today some of these practices are not perceived as entirely negative in some legal systems.
In USA, Federal authorities took over some regulation of insider trading in 1933 and 1934, and the ambit of that regulation expanded greatly in the 1960s . USA model relies to a high degree in strong control by Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). Nowadays, it is said that American hostility towards insider trading is a reflection of American "egalitarianism and obsession with the appearance of fair play" 23 , whilst other countries still take less strict view and take into account possible positive effects of some of these circumstances 24 . Today, insider trading regulation is among the subjects which underwent a strong convergence process as part of the internationalization of securities markets. Within the last 20 years, EU members, Japan, and other countries have prohibited insider trading in similar circumstances to the United States, in order to improve the performance of their nation's capital markets. A good example of this trend is the European Union Council Directive on market abuse 25 . Although there had been pre-existing 23 European insider trading regulations of significancereforms followed the American model 26 . By the change of the Century, most developed nations have USA.-style insider trading laws 27 . The main reason behind this convergence is the need to attract investment to listed Corporations.
Disclosure
Disclosure to the shareholders and to the market is a key mechanism to improve Company Law and Corporate Governance. Disclosure to all stakeholders is less developed and, in some instances may even be prohibited (trade secrets, patents, etc.). Disclosure rules are designed primarily to provide the capital markets with financial information about firm performance, and they are also effective to avoid conflict of interest transactions.
Corporate governance and disclosure regimes are closely related, as disclosure is a powerful means for fighting agency and conflict of interest problems. Accounting standards and Securities regulation play a central role in determining the scope of disclosure in this regard.
The first clearly mandatory disclosure regulation was approved in 1907 by the New York Stock Exchange, at a time when disclosure did not occupy a preeminent space 28 . In USA, Federal legislation had a strong influence in the disclosure of information by public companies since 1933 and 1934 (Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act), but the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 federalised a reinforced duty of management towards greater transparency. Also, some states such as the influential Delaware's legislator firmly opened the door to General Meeting's participation exclusively via electronic-Internet means. In Europe, the Winter Report of November 2002 placed transparency and information to shareholders at the heart of the criteria which were to lead reforms in EU Corporate exceptions for buy back programmes and stabilisation of financial instruments. 26 Memminger 
Shareholder voting and interests in the decision making processes
Shareholder voting is an integral component of corporate governance. From a managerial perspective, active shareholder involvement in corporate decision making could be perceived as a breach to the authority in the Board of directors. However, shareholder activism does not necessarily mean eroding Boards' power. It simply implies that management decisions can be reviewed. The core of shareholders activism is shareholders' vote and the right to propose issues to the General Meeting. Shareholder voting can serve distinct purposes. In closely held corporations with a small number of shareholders, all of whom have ready access to information about the business, voting is close to effectively exercising managerial power. In public corporations in which there are controlling shareholders, a model typical of European big Corporations, those controlling shareholders have substantial access to information as well as incentives to vote exercising oversight functions.
In corporations with disperse ownership, typical of USA, shareholders have diverse preferences, and usually lack both the knowledge and the incentives necessary to exercise an informed vote. The difficulty for achieving consensus among thousands of actors makes it harder for shareholders to adopt an active role. Also, it may occur that only some accrue direct benefits from activism: this is a classic example of a situation in which free riding is highly likely. However, good corporate governance depends on appropriate frameworks which encourage the commercial and political life. Any regulatory or statutory breaches of professional conduct should be reported in full; The main terms of each director's service contract or other contractual terms or letters of appointment. (Part 2: Directors). Pensions Investment Research Consultants (UK), PIRC Shareholder Voting Guidelines (1993 and regularly revised). 32 Corporate governance is an issue of concern to a wider audience….. since it relates to the exercise of power and the success of business and the wider economy. PIRC considers that corporate governance involves consideration of the range of relationships entered into by companies. Although the prime focus is on the board and accountability to shareholders, directors should identify their key stakeholders, and should report on and be held accountable for the quality of these relation-ships since they underpin long-term business success. shareholders to exercise their rights and use their influence resulting in the management protecting the interests of the shareholders as best as possible 33 34 . In USA the annual proxy solicitation is controlled by SEC regulation, whilst state law occupies a secondary role. In the 1950s, serious proxy fights became a major corporate law issue. State decisions favoured insurgents, but federal authorities regulated proxy contests. Proxy rules were widely viewed as responses to managerial pressure that limited insurgent shareholder's actions 35 . In Europe the Directive on Cross border voting eases the exercise of such rights 36 .There are a number of different reasons behind the enactment of this Directive. In much of Europe there is no long tradition of proxy voting by shareholders, and this Directive enhances that voting in particular in relation with shareholders that do not reside in the same country where the Company has its seat. It was passed after other securities directives granted shareholder protection through disclosure. It contains principles, mandatory rules and rules that offer options. Its main provisions are: Equal treatment of shareholders as to participation and voting in the general meeting (Art 7); mandatory notice of general meeting of at least 30 days and certain required information 37 ; right to put 49 . In a case involving the announcement of a Company 50 not to hire gay or lesbian workers, and the New York City Employees' Retirement System wish putting forth a proposal to implement a nondiscrimination hiring policy with respect to sexual orientation; the SEC permitted the proposed exclusion and, after a long process, although the court ruled in favour of the claimant 51 , this decision was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals 52 . Soon after, a task force was formed to examine the proposal process and the results showed that 91% of companies preferred the rule allowing exclusion of employment-related proposals, while 86% of shareholders preferred to be able to include them 53 .
a primary need to balance owners and managers rights and powers. 
